The hopes of the Democratic Party for victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election were largely tied to mobilizing women as an electoral bloc. Given that the issue of abortion rights became one of the key dividing lines between Trump and Harris, the Democrats sought to turn the electoral contest into a battle of the sexes. This strategy proved successful in the 2022 midterm elections, where they limited the expected advantage that Republicans were projected to gain as the opposition force. The logic behind this approach was also based on the empirical fact that women in the U.S. traditionally participate more actively in elections than men—particularly young women and African Americans, who demonstrate consistent support for liberal policies.

The U.S. elections indeed turned out to be, in part, a battle of the sexes, but the result did not meet the Democrats’ expectations. Donald Trump won all the key contested states, secured a majority in the Electoral College, and even gained a lead in the popular vote—something that hasn’t been achieved since George W. Bush’s victory in 2004 against John Kerry. Back then, the victory was attributed to the so-called value voters—groups that support traditional values and reject liberal policies. After those elections, as well as now, many media outlets hastened to predict the Democrats’ downfall. However, the 2008 financial crisis reshuffled the political landscape, and Obama ushered in a golden age for liberalism. This period continued until last year.

After his first victory in 2016, achieved through a majority in the Electoral College but not in the popular vote, Trump had limited success in implementing his cultural agenda. His victory was often interpreted as the swan song of older white men—a group with a declining share, but still relatively high among active voters. Their success against Obama’s Coalition of the Ascendant was seen as a statistical anomaly and a result of an archaic electoral system that allowed Trump to win by narrow margins in several key states in the Midwest, despite losing the popular vote by over two million.

However, his success in the last election was seen as a much stronger signal than in 2016, or even compared to Bush Jr.’s victory in 2004. This allowed Trump to initiate a large-scale implementation of his cultural agenda, including the cessation of “diversity and inclusion” (D&I) initiatives in both the public and private sectors.

One reason for this was the electoral palette and newly attracted demographic groups that Trump consolidated against Harris[1]. Predictably, he once again won the votes of white women, married voters, and older white men. At the same time, he expanded his influence among Spanish-speaking men, reduced Harris’s lead among African American men, and some studies even indicate a symbolic victory among Native American voters[2].

However, the most significant change was in his support among young white men. Until recently, they were seen as reliable Democratic voters, and their Generation Z was considered the most liberal in history. It indeed is the most liberal generation—at least among young women[3]. Data shows that young men, including those from minority groups, display more conservative attitudes compared to their counterparts from 20 years ago.

This has created a divide between them and women, and this trend is not limited to the United States. In Poland, for example, a similar tendency is observed: men around 20 tend to support nationalist movements, while women support progressive parties and candidates. In South Korea, the gender polarization is even more pronounced[4], with the economic and cultural aspects of gender leading to conflicts in political preferences.

In the U.S., the Democrats’ reaction was to accuse young white men of sexism, discrimination, and an inability to see a black woman as a potential commander-in-chief. Such messages were articulated both by political leaders, including Barack Obama, and through campaigns like White Dudes for Kamala[5]. This campaign lost its legitimacy after it was revealed that some participants were paid actors. Researchers like Pippa Norris have concluded that such prejudices played a key role in Hillary Clinton’s 2016 loss, as she failed to address the skepticism of older voters. However, this explanation is less helpful when it comes to the youth.

A key factor in Trump’s victory was the influence of social media. The Republican candidate appeared on several popular podcasts and digital platforms, and it is believed that his young son Barron directed him toward this strategy. His participation in the world’s most successful podcaster Joe Rogan’s show, for example, portrayed Trump in a more human, friendly light—far removed from his popular media image. However, this explanation is incomplete, as it does not answer why podcasts from the so-called manosphere are so popular and successful.

Some young men feel that popular culture offers no positive portrayals of masculinity. Equality policies, including D&I programs, are sometimes seen as restricting their opportunities. Similar trends can be observed in Hollywood. Stories created for young men as the primary target audience have undergone a sharp feminization and have been directed towards their female peers. This creates a counter-effect: instead of encouraging integration, it strengthens the feeling of marginalization.

In this sense, the infamous outcry of the neo-fascist Nick Fuentes, Your body, my choice, mocking the abortion rights campaigns after Trump’s victory (their slogan being My body, my choice), rightly sparked outrage. However, it was preceded by the slogan popularized in classrooms—particularly by young female teachers—Girls rule, boys drool.

Beyond the cultural plan, structural economic changes are also influencing this trend. The loss of stable jobs, labor market uncertainty, and limited opportunities for social mobility create feelings of insecurity and frustration[6]. Young men face difficulties in finding stable employment and incomes that would allow them to take a leading role in family life.

Additionally, one of the key focuses of the Democrats’ campaign was the fight against gender inequalities, but in reality, this affects more elite and high-paying professions than ordinary people. Today, women are more likely to enter university and graduate[7]. When these processes are combined with rhetoric that emphasizes the privilege of young men, an environment is created where conservative messages find a more receptive audience. As an experienced reality TV guru, Trump picked up on the pulse of this electoral bloc and made targeted efforts to turn it into a fanatical contingent willing to do anything for him.

In this context, two possible paths emerge for the Democrats. One is to fully embrace political correctness (woke culture), as Republicans did with the Make America Great Again movement, which would cement young men’s support for the right and may even radicalize them further. The second is to pivot to the center, reduce the intensity of the culture wars, and court their vote, thereby reducing polarization in society. The latter approach is difficult, as the most radical voters usually dominate the primaries and set the tone of party politics. Thus, American politics becomes a victim of its own electoral system—something analysts Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt point out in their book How Democracies Die.

It is not unlikely that the male vote, combined with the support of women who back them, could provide a lasting advantage for the Republicans, allowing them to dominate at the national level. Trump won men by a larger margin than Harris won women, and this proved decisive. Such a development would not be unprecedented: it happened during the Nixon and Reagan decades, as well as under Ron DeSantis in Florida—once one of the most contested states.

The question remains whether this political distribution will actually improve the situation of young men—economically, culturally, or socially—or will only lead to performative changes. As Francis Fukuyama notes in Identity, the reality shaped by pop culture often does not align with actual reality. If women and African Americans seem privileged in fictional works, this is not exactly the case in reality.

Nevertheless, the feeling of rejection and neglect could form lasting electoral identities—and if young men continue to feel isolated from the left, they are likely to remain loyal to the right, regardless of the real policies in their favor, just as the majority of African Americans continue to support the Democrats.

Political behavior is often driven not so much by rational interest as by identity, belonging, and emotional impulses—as Christopher Aiken and Larry Bartels highlight in Democracy for Realists. In this context, Trump seems to be successfully building a new political identity among young men—a process to which the Democrats have yet to find an adequate response.

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[1] CNN. “Exit Poll from the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election.” CNN. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/election/2024/exit-polls.

[2] Note: Not all agree with this statistic, partly because of the archaic term “Indians” used by the exit pollsters, which has since been replaced with the term “Native Americans.”

[3] New York Times. “Trump’s Rising Popularity Among Young Men.” The New York Times, August 24, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/24/upshot/trump-polls-young-men.html.

[4] Gong, Se Eun. “Elections Reveal a Growing Gender Divide Across South Korea.” NPR, April 10, 2024. https://www.npr.org/2024/04/10/1243819495/elections-reveal-a-growing-gender-divide-across-south-korea.

[5] “White Dudes for Harris.” Official Website. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://whitedudesforharris.com/.

[6] Lallhee, Jason, and Jacob Denkula. “Young Men Work Less, but They’re Financially Independent and Happier.” Business Insider, June 2023. https://www.businessinsider.com/young-men-work-less-financially-independent-salary-marriageability-2023-6.

[7] Nietzel, Michael T. “Women Continue to Outpace Men in College Enrollment and Graduation.” Forbes, August 7, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeltnietzel/2024/08/07/women-continue-to-outpace-men-in-college-enrollment-and-graduation/.